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Abstract
Most democratic countries use election methods to transform elec-
tion results into whole numbers which usually give the number of seats
in a legislative body the parties obtained. Which election method does
this best can be specified by measuring the error between the allocated
result and the ideal proportion. We show how to find an election
method which is best suited to a given error function. We also dis-
cuss several properties of election methods that have been labelled
paradoxa. In particular we explain the highly publicised “Alabama”
Paradox for the Hare/Hamilton method and show that other popular
election methods come with their very own paradoxa.
1 Introduction
Practically all democratic countries are faced with the problem of selecting
members of their legislative bodies according to votes of their population.
The method by which this selection of representatives is performed is com-
monly known as an election method. Its main function is to transform the
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election results, which are usually the number of votes for various candidates
or parties, into whole numbers which usually give the number of seats in a
legislative body. Nearly every democratic country employs its own favourite
election method. This immediately leads to the question of which election
method is in some sense optimal and most just? This is not an easy question
to answer as one can see from the vast amount of literature it has generated.
History shows that at various times different election methods were in favour
and many countries have changed their election method in the past.
One can distinguish between two major types of election methods, namely
the majority voting methods and the proportional voting methods. The ma-
jority voting method is used, for example, in Great Britain to elect members
of parliament and in the United States of America to elect members of the
congress. In this method, the eligible voters are divided into voting districts
and, in its purest form, each district elects one candidate by majority vote.
It is well known that the percentage of members in parliament or congress
belonging to a given party need not be close to the percentage of votes this
party obtained overall. For this reason, we do not consider this voting method
in this paper.
Among the most frequently discussed proportional voting systems are the
D’Hondt or Jefferson method (e.g. used in Germany until 1983, still used
in many countries), the Hare or Hamilton method (used e.g. in Germany,
Tasmania, used in the US 1840 to 1890) and Sainte-Lague¨ or Webster method
(used in New Zealand).
The main aim of this paper is to present a general treatment of all pro-
portional voting methods. Mathematically, the accuracy of a voting method
can be measured by a so-called error function, a function which measures
the gravity of the error between the exact votes and the allocated seats. In
practice error functions are dictated by courts or legislative bodies and these
error functions need not coincide with mathematical error functions. We
show in Theorem 6.2 how to find a proportional voting method which min-
imises a given error function. A slightly weaker version of this theorem has
been announced by Niemeyer and Wolf (1984), [8]. Here we give a first com-
plete proof. We demonstrate how most of the well known election methods
can be obtained from this general result by special choices of error functions.
The Hare method can be singled out by the fact that it minimises infinitely
many different error functions. This is certainly not the case for the meth-
ods of D’Hondt and Sainte-Lague¨. Another aim of this paper is to give a
mathematical argument as to why the Hare method is the best among the
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proportional voting methods.
Each voting method can lead to results which appear paradoxical. We
discuss various paradoxa which have enjoyed a lot of attention in the litera-
ture, for example, the so-called Alabama Paradox for the Hare method. We
argue that in many cases the ”paradoxity” is only in the eye of the beholder.
In particular, the methods of D’Hondt and Sainte-Lague¨ are blessed with
their own paradoxa.
2 Background
This paper is concerned with four different but mathematically related prob-
lems. First there is the apportionment problem as seen in the example of
the American House of Representatives of the United States Congress, where
each state of the union is entitled to a number of seats, at least one, according
to and as closely proportional as possible to its number of legal inhabitants.
The latter is determined every ten years by a census of the United States.
Each state is subdivided into voting districts according to how many seats
are assigned to it and the representatives of each district are assigned by a
majority vote.
Second there is the apportionment problem for political parties partici-
pating in an election of a country where seats in the parliament are assigned
to parties as proportionally as possible to the election results. As an ex-
ample we can take the German Federal election. Germany is divided into
voting districts. The number of seats in parliament is twice the number of
voting districts. Voters receive a ballot on which there are two votes. The
second vote (Zweitstimme) is cast for a political party. The number of seats
in parliament is assigned to eligible parties as proportionally as possible to
these second votes. (A party is eligible if it received at least 5% of the to-
tal number of second votes or at least three seats by first vote.) The first
vote (Erststimme) is to determine by simple majority a representative for the
voting district in parliament. The elected candidates receive seats in parlia-
ment which are counted towards the allocated number of seats of the party
they represent. The remaining seats are distributed among the participating
parties according to the second votes and according to the election method
used. It may happen that a party obtains more seats by the first vote (Er-
ststimme) than is allowed according to the second vote (Zweitstimme). The
parties keep those seats and they are called “U¨berhangmandate”. Using a
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first and second vote, the Federal elections combines the important feature of
the majority election methods, that each voting district is represented by a
member of parliament, with the advantage of proportional election methods,
by which the number of seats allocated to a party is as closely proportional
to the number of votes as possible. Of course, there is always the difficulty
that one or more parties get more seats directly than by the number of total
votes.
The third problem is that of rounding a list of given numbers, so that the
total sum of the rounded numbers equals the rounded (standard rounded)
sum. The easiest example perhaps is that of rounding percentage numbers,
which add up to 100%, but after (standard) rounding fail to add up to 100%.
Another problem can be the amount of exports of a certain commodity given
in Euro by each country of the European community, for instance. The
press publishes figures representing the exports of each country rounded to
millions of Euros. The total amount is also rounded to the nearest million
independently of the individual figures. Now the problem is that the rounded
figures should add up to the rounded total.
The fourth problem comes from Operations Research. Let us assume that
a factory is producing indivisible goods, e.g. cars of the same make. The profit
is to be distributed among the share holders as closely proportional to the
number of shares as possible.
2.1 Describing the four problems mathematically
In all of these problems we can start with a positive integer M , where M
represents the number of seats in the first and second problem; M denotes
the sum of the rounded integers in the third problem; M is the number of
goods produced in the fourth problem. Let n denote the number of states
in the Union, or parties, or numbers to be rounded, or shareholders in a
manufacturing company. Further, we define a real n-dimensional vector a =
(a1, . . . , an) and an integer vector m = (m1, . . . ,mn). Let A denote the sum
of the entries of a. In the first problem aj is the number of votes in the j-th
state, A the total number of votes and mj is the number of seats allocated to
the state. Let qj = ajM/A be the exact quota, that is the exact proportion
of seats the j-th state may claim. In the second problem aj is the number
of votes party j obtains and mj is the number of seats allocated to party j.
Let qj = ajM/A be the exact quota, that is the exact proportion of seats the
j-th party may claim. In the third problem aj is the j-th given number and
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Figure 1: Election Polyhedra
mj is the integer obtained by the rounding process applied to ajM . Here let
qj = aj. In the fourth problem, aj is the exact quota to which the j-th share
holder is entitled to and mj the number of goods he receives. Again we let
qj = aj.
This leads to the following definitions. We are interested in sets of vectors
whose entries are the exact quotas. Let M be a positive integer (e.g. number
of seats) and A a positive real number (e.g. number of valid votes). Let
Q = {(q1, . . . , qn) | qj ∈ R, qj ≥ 0,
n∑
i=1
qi = M}.
This set contains all possible exact quotas among n parties (where in prob-
lems one and two we computed the exact quotas from a total of A valid
votes). Note that we allow Q to contain real vectors. Let
M = {(m1, . . . ,mn) | mj ∈ Z, mj ≥ 0 and
n∑
j=1
mj = M}
be the subset of all integer vectors whose entries are non-negative and sum
to M . Note thatM is a lattice over the integers and represents the possible
seat allocations.
We illustrate the set Q for 3 parties and for M = 5 in Figure 1. The set
Q is a unilateral triangle in the space R3. Its corners are (5, 0, 0), (0, 5, 0) and
(0, 0, 5). The black dots represent the exact quotas which are also possible
seat distributions, that is exact quotas which lie in M. The other points in
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the triangle correspond to all points in Q. A valid apportionment method
should map every point in the triangle to a seat allocation. It should be pos-
sible to draw a region around each black dot containing only this one black
dot such that all exact quotas inside this region are mapped to the seat allo-
cation to which the black dot is mapped. We believe a good apportionment
should map a black dot to the seat allocation it describes.
Finally, the apportionment method might have a choice of which seat
allocation to choose for the exact quotas which lie on the borders between
two or more possible regions.
An apportionment method is in principal a function which maps each pos-
sible vote distribution to a certain seat distribution. For a precise definition
see p. 97 Balinski and Young (1982).
We believe a good apportionment method should satisfy
If q ∈M then f(q) = {q}. (1)
In most cases a and M are fixed. Sometimes it might be necessary to
emphasise the dependence of f on a and M , in which case fa,M denotes an
apportionment method with given a and M .
While a mathematical definition of an apportionment method is suffi-
cient to procure a meaningful apportionment, considerations of fairness dic-
tate additional requirements. Especially the order in which the parties are
listed on a ballot should have no effect on the outcome of the election, that
is the apportionment method should be symmetric. Formally, let pi be a
permutation of {1, . . . , n} and let q ∈ Q be the n-dimensional real vector
(q1, . . . , qn). If we define q
pi = (q1pi , . . . , qnpi). If B is a subset of Q then define
Bpi = {bpi | b ∈ B}.
Definition 2.1. (Symmetry of an apportioning method) An apportionment
method is symmetric, if for every permutation pi of {1, . . . , n} we have f(qpi) =
(f(q))pi.
The outcome of a reasonable election method should depend only on the
vectors of the exact quotas, that is if two different vote distributions yield the
same exact quotas, the results should be the same. Thus the apportionment
method should be homogeneous.
Definition 2.2. (Homogeneity) An apportionment method is homogeneous
if for every real λ > 0 we have fλa,M(q) = fa,M(q).
From now on all apportionment methods are symmetric and homoge-
neous.
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3 Overview over various apportionment meth-
ods
Historically, many apportionment methods have been discussed in political
assemblies and in the literature. In this paper we are concerned with two
major classes: the divisor methods and the rounding methods. Examples of
the divisor methods are the methods of D’Hondt and Sainte-Lague¨. The best
known rounding method is the Hare method, also called the method of the
greatest remainders. A detailed description of these methods can be found in
Balinski and Young (1982), [2]. Here we give a very brief overview in order
to establish the notation we use for the various methods.
The divisor methods start with a strictly increasing sequence (dj)j∈N of
non-negative real numbers, called the sequence of divisors. We then have to
divide the exact quotas qk for k = 1, . . . , n by the dj and define the M × n
matrix whose entry in row j and column k is qk/dj. We select the M largest
entries of this matrix and count the number mk of entries selected from the
k-th column. Then the party Pk will get mk seats. A linear divisor method
is given by an arithmetically increasing sequence (dj)j∈N, that is dj = d(d0 +
(j− 1)), where d and d0 are fixed real numbers. As d divides all terms of the
sequence dj, we can omit d by the homogeneity of the apportionment method,
that is we can choose as sequence of divisors the sequence dj = d0 + (j − 1).
Linear divisor methods have been treated extensively in the literature,
see for example the literature review by Heinrich et al. (2005), [5]. The
following sequences yield some well known linear divisor methods (see [7, p.
124]):
d0 Method
0 Adams
1/3 Danish Method
2/5 Condorcet
1/2 Sainte-Lague¨ or Webster
2/3 Considerant
1 D’Hondt or Jefferson
2 Imperiali
Note that for d0 ≤ 1 the linear divisor methods satisfy Equation (1).
Non-linear divisor methods have also been considered. The most well-
known ones are the Dean method, where dj = j(j − 1)/(j − 1/2), and the
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method of Hill or Huntington, where dj =
√
j(j − 1).
As we will see later, the values d0 = 0 is biased towards towards small
parties, d0 = 1 is biased towards large parties, whereas the value d0 = 1/2 is
considered to be neutral.
Let ρ be real constant with 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. The ρ-rounding method (see
Kopfermann [7, p. 117]) considers the exact quotas qj and put q
ρ
j :=
qj
M
(M +
2ρ− 1). Then we have that ∑nj=1 qρj = (M + 2ρ− 1) and let µρj = bqρj c. Then
n∑
j=1
µρj ≤

M − 1 for ρ = 0
M for 0 < ρ < 1
M + 1 for ρ = 1
(2)
For 0 ≤ ρ < 1 we have therefore∑nj=1 qρj ≤M and we define rρj = qρj −µρj .
We start by allocating µρj seats to party Pj. This leaves M−
∑n
j=1 µ
ρ
j or, when
ρ = 0, M −∑nj=1 µρj + 1, unallocated seats. Party Pj obtains an additional
seat if rρj is among the M −
∑n
j=1 µ
ρ
j (or M −
∑n
j=1 µ
ρ
j + 1) largest numbers
of rρ1, . . . , r
ρ
n. If ρ = 0 there is still a problem if all qi are integers. In this case
all r0j = 0 and we have to assign one additional seat. This is allocated to a
party at random. In the case ρ = 1 and all qi are integers, we have assigned
one seat too many and this seat is taken from a random party among the
parties who obtained more seats than their exact quota.
For ρ = 1/2 we obviously have the well-known method of the greatest
remainder. This method is also known under the name Hare or Hamilton.
For all other values of ρ (0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1) we have a general rounding method or a
general greatest remainder method. We will discuss these methods especially
with respect to their effect on the apportionment method a little later.
Note that for 0 < ρ < 1 the ρ-rounding methods satisfy Equation (1).
4 Constraints
In this section we examine the constraints of apportionment methods, which
are necessary or beneficial for solving the four problems considered above.
There are several possibilities to enforce certain conditions. Not all of
these conditions can be fulfilled exactly but it is also important to be able
to compute the probability with which a condition is violated when choosing
an apportionment method.
These conditions are as follows:
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1. Bias Condition: The apportionment method should be free of bias,
that is it should neither favour large nor small parties. Suppose L, S
are subsets of {1, . . . , n} such that mj > mi whenever j ∈ L and i ∈ S.
Then an apportionment method favours large parties if∑
i∈Lmi∑
i∈L ai
>
∑
j∈Smj∑
j∈S aj
and it favours small parties if∑
i∈Lmi∑
i∈L ai
<
∑
j∈Smj∑
j∈S aj
,
see [2, p. 125].
2. Monotony Condition: If one party has a larger exact quota than
another, it cannot receive less seats, that is if qj < qk then mj ≤ mk
for all j, k with j, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
3. Lower Quota Condition: Each party is assigned at least as many
seats as the largest integer less than or equal to the exact quota, that
is bqjc ≤ mj for all j with 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
4. Upper Quota Condition: Each party receives at most as many
seats as the least integer greater or equal to the exact quota, that is
mj ≤ dqje for all j with 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
5. Majority Condition: If a party obtains the absolute majority of
the votes then it receives the absolute majority of the seats, that is if
for some j with 1 ≤ j ≤ n we have aj > 12A (and hence qj > 12M) then
mj >
1
2
M .
6. Coalition Condition: If a party has less than half of the total
number of votes then it receives also less than half of the total number
of seats, that is if for some j with 1 ≤ j ≤ n we have aj < 12A (and
hence qj <
1
2
M) then mj <
1
2
M .
This conditions is called Coalition Condition as it ensures that in a
three party method the coalition of the two smaller parties which re-
ceived together the absolute majority of the votes, will also receive the
absolute majority of the seats.
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7. Independence Condition: The number mj of seats assigned to the
party Pj depends only on the exact quota qj but not on the distribution
of the quotas qk of other parties Pk for k 6= j.
8. House Monotony: Let a be a vector of votes. Let m be the seat
distribution obtained from a in the case that there are M seats and
m˜ the seat distribution obtained from a in the case that there are
M + 1 seats. Then a House monotone apportionment method satisfies
m ≤ m˜.
The following table indicates when the conditions are satisfied for the
ρ-rounding methods and the linear divisor methods for given d0.
Condition ρ-rounding method d0 linear divisor method
Homogeneity always always
Unbiased ρ = 1/2 δ0 = 1/2 [2, Prop. 5.3]
Monotony always always
Lower Quota 1/2 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 [7, p.120] n−2
n−1 ≤ d0 ≤ 1 [7, p.131]
Upper Quota 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1/2 [7, p.120] 0 ≤ d0 ≤ 1n−1 [7, p.131]
Majority ρ = 1, M odd [7, p.121] d0 = 1, M odd [7, p.131]
Coalition ρ = 0, M odd [7, p.121] d0 = 0, M odd [7, p.131]
Independence n ≤ 2 or mi = mj [7, p.97] n ≤ 2 or mi = mj [7, p.97]
House Monot. never all [2, Cor. 4.3.1, p.117]
All non-linear divisor methods are homogeneous. None is unbiased, see
[2, Prop. 5.3], all are monotone. No non-linear divisor method satisfies both
the upper and lower quota condition, however it never violates both simulta-
neously, see [2, Prop. 6.4 and 6.5]. All non-linear divisor methods are House
monotone, see [2, Cor. 4.3.1, p. 117].
A method for computing the seat bias for a given apportionment method
with a hurdle (e.g. the 5% hurdle) can be found in Schwingenschlo¨gl and
Pukelsheim (2006), [13]. Another condition, a Gentle Majority Condition,
which is important for forming committees is discussed in Pukelsheim (2006),
[12].
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5 A modification of Hare and the history of
the Hare-Niemeyer Method in Germany
It all started with an article in the newspaper “Frankfurter Allgemeine”
(FAZ) by Dr. K.F. Fromme which appeared on 14 October 1970, pointing
out the difficulties in determining the number of seats each party gets in the
various committees pursuant to the 1970 elections in the Federal Republic of
Germany. In this election, the CDU/CSU won 253 seats in parliament, the
SPD 237 and the FDP 28, giving the SPD/FDP coalition under Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt a majority of 265 seats (including the members from Berlin,
who did not always have a vote but were counted in the assignment of seats
in the committees). The D’Hondt system was used at that time to determine
the number of parliamentary seats a given party won in general elections and
to determine the distribution of committee seats.
The difficulty that Fromme pointed out was the paradoxon that - in a
committee with a given number of 33 seats - the distribution according to
D’Hondt was as follows: the CDU/CSU was assigned 17 seats, SPD 15 and
the FDP l, thus giving the opposition party a majority. The same is also true
e.g. for committees with 33, 31, 29, . . . , 9 members. This led to a discussion in
parliament about changing the size of the committees because it was assumed
that a method better than D’Hondt “would be hard to find”. The political
question which now arose was how to keep the majority and the mathematical
question concerned which method to use. After giving the matter some
thought, on 16 October 1970 the first author wrote to the administration of
the Bundestag suggesting the method of the largest remainders, which was
subsequently adopted.
Almost seven years later, the CDU/FDP coalition in the state Niedersach-
sen wanted to introduce legislation which would replace the D’Hondt-system
by the Hare-system. But the procedure left a couple of questions open.
Therefore, the committees of the state parliament which were discussing this
piece of legislation invited the first author to a joint hearing on 23 March
1977. The problem they discussed was the following: Even with the Hare
method it can happen, that a coalition of parties with the majority of the
seats in parliament does not get a majority of the seats in a committee.
As an example to demonstrate that the Hare method does not always
satisfy the Majority Condition consider three parties competing for M = 101
seats. They received 50600, 40650 and 9750 votes, respectively. The exact
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quotas they receive are q1 = 50.6; q2 = 40, 65, q3 = 9.75. Then, according to
the Hare method, the seat distributions are m1 = 50,m2 = 41 and m3 = 10
and so the first party does not have the majority of the seats, even though
it received the majority of the votes.
In general, the Hare method does not always satisfy the Majority Condi-
tion when M is odd. If M = 2k + 1, then it is possible that a party obtains
more than 50% of the votes but only receives k seats. However, it is not
possible that the party receives less than k seats as is possible using the
Sainte-Lague¨ method. Further, it is also fairly easy to fix this situation as
suggested by the first author. If a party obtains more than 50% of the votes
then its quota is at least k + 1/2. If one gives one of the remaining seats to
this party, then the Majority Condition is fulfilled and it is still possible to
redistribute the remaining seats such that each party gets at least the lower
quota. D’Hondt’s method favors the largest party so much so, that it can
receive more than q + 1 seats, where q is the exact quota. This is because
this method does not satisfy the Upper Quota Condition.
As a result of this hearing, the parliament in Niedersachsen decided to
hold the elections in Niedersachsen according to the modified Hare method,
sometimes also called the Hare-Niemeyer procedure. However, in 1986 this
method was again replaced by the d’Hondt method (see [14]).
From 1987 onwards the Hare-Niemeyer method has also been used to for
the seat allocations in the German Bundestag until it was replaced in 2008
by the method of Sainte-Lague¨ (see [15]).
6 On the error function of a general appor-
tionment method
We start with a general apportionment problem. Suppose M seats in par-
liament are to be distributed among parties P1, . . . , Pn. Suppose further the
parties received votes a1, . . . , an, represented by the vector a = (a1, . . . , an),
and let A =
∑n
i=1 ai. Then the exact quotas are qj =
Maj
A
for 1 ≤ j ≤ n
and are exactly proportional to the number of votes party Pj received. Let f
be an apportionment method. In any apportionment method the transition
from a vector q with real entries to a vector m with integer entries is bound
to cause errors. On the one hand we can measure individual errors between
qj and mj for 1 ≤ j ≤ n and on the other hand there is a global error
12
which comprises the individual errors. The following definition captures the
properties of an error function which is decomposable into individual error
functions.
Definition 6.1. For 1 ≤ j ≤ n let ϕj : N→ R≥0 be functions such that the
functions Hj : N+ → R≥0 defined by Hj(`) = ϕj(`)−ϕj(`−1) are increasing.
Then the function ψ :M→ R≥0 defined by ψ(m) =
∑n
j=1 ϕj(mj) is called a
decomposable error function. The function ϕj(x) is called the jth component
of ψ.
Further, we have
ψ(m) = ψ(0) +
n∑
j=1
mj∑
`=1
Hj(`). (3)
Decomposable error functions are also considered by Gaffke and Pukelsheim
(2008). For a given a decomposable error function ψ the following theorem
describes an algorithm called MinimalSolution to determine the vector
m0 ∈ M which minimizes the error function. Hence for a given decompos-
able error function the theorem can be used to give rise to an apportionment
method, namely the method which assigns each vector a the vector m0 which
minimizes the error function, see also Niemeyer and Wolf (1984). For divisor
methods see also the Min-Max Theorem of Balinski and Young (1982), [2, p.
100].
Theorem 6.2. Let ψ be a decomposable error function. Then
1. There is at least one solution m0 ∈ M which minimizes the error
function ψ;
2. m0 = (m
0
1, . . . ,m
0
n) is a minimal solution if and only if Hj(m
0
j + 1) ≥
Hk(m
0
k) for all j, k ∈ {1, . . . , n};
3. m0 is unique if Hj(m
0
j + 1) > Hk(m
0
k) for all j, k ∈ {1, . . . , n} with
j 6= k;
4. Consider the following algorithm MinimalSolution: Let S denote
the set of m = (m1, . . . ,mn) such that
(a)
∑n
j=1mj = M ,
13
(b) the multiset {Hj(`) | 1 ≤ ` ≤ mj, 1 ≤ j ≤ n} contains M smallest
elements of the matrix H1(1) . . . Hn(1)... ...
H1(M) . . . Hn(M)
 .
Then S consists of all minimal solutions.
Proof.
1. The existence follows from the fact that the image of M under ψ is a
finite subset of R≥0 and therefore has a minimal subset. Hence there
is at least one element m ∈M for which ψ(m) is the minimum and so
m is a minimal solution.
2. Suppose first that m0 = (m
0
1, . . . ,m
0
n) is a minimal solution and j, k ∈
{1, . . . , n}. If j = k the result follows since Hj(`) is increasing. Now
suppose j 6= k. Choose another solution m1 which differs from m0 in
exactly two components, namely m1j = m
0
j + 1 and m
1
k = m
0
k− 1. Since
m0 is minimal we have ψ(m0) ≤ ψ(m1) and hence
n∑
i=1
ϕi(m
0
i ) ≤
n∑
i=1
ϕi(m
1
i )
which implies
ϕj(m
0
j) + ϕk(m
0
k) ≤ ϕj(m1j) + ϕk(m1k)
= ϕj(m
0
j + 1) + ϕk(m
0
k − 1)
and so
Hk(m
0
k) = ϕk(m
0
k)− ϕk(m0k − 1)
≤ ϕj(m0j + 1)− ϕj(m0j) = Hj(m0j + 1).
On the other hand suppose m0 is a solution for which Hk(m
0
k) ≤
Hj(m
0
j + 1) for all j, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let m = (m1, . . . ,mn) be another
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solution. Then ψ(m) =
∑n
j=1 ϕj(mj). Compare the values of ψ at m
0
j
with those at arbitrary points mj and note
M =
n∑
j=1
m0j =
n∑
j=1
mj.
Therefore one can divide the indices 1, . . . , n, for which m0j 6= mj into
two disjoint sets J1 and J2, according to whether m
0
j < mj or m
0
j > mj.
Then
∑
j∈J1(mj −m0j) =
∑
j∈J2(m
0
j −mj). This yields that
ψ(m)− ψ(m0)
=
∑
j∈J1
(
ϕj(mj)− ϕj(m0j)
)
+
∑
j∈J2
(
ϕj(mj)− ϕj(m0j)
)
= L−R
and that
L =
∑
j∈J1
(
ϕj(mj)− ϕj(m0j)
)
=
∑
j∈J1
(
Hj(mj) +Hj(mj − 1) + · · ·+Hj(m0j + 1)
)
≥
∑
j∈J1
(
mj −m0j
) ·Hj(m0j + 1)
≥ min
j∈J1
Hj(m
0
j + 1) ·
∑
j∈J1
(
mj −m0j
)
.
On the other hand
R =
∑
j∈J2
(
ϕj(m
0
j)− ϕj(mj)
)
=
∑
j∈J2
(
Hj(m
0
j) +Hj(m
0
j − 1) + · · ·+Hj(mj + 1)
)
≤
∑
j∈J2
(
m0j −mj
) ·Hj(m0j)
≤ max
j∈J2
Hj(m
0
j) ·
∑
j∈J2
(
m0j −mj
)
≤ max
j∈J2
Hj(m
0
j) ·
∑
j∈J1
(
mj −m0j
)
.
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Then finally
L−R ≥ min
j∈J1
Hj(m
0
j + 1) ·
∑
j∈J1
(
mj −m0j
)−max
j∈J2
Hj(m
0
j) ·
∑
j∈J1
(
mj −m0j
)
≥
(
min
j∈J1
Hj(m
0
j + 1)−max
j∈J2
Hj(m
0
j)
)
·
∑
j∈J1
(
mj −m0j
)
≥
(
min
j∈J1
Hj(m
0
j + 1)−max
j∈J2
Hj(m
0
j)
)
.
By or assumption, Hj(m
0
j + 1) ≥ Hk(m0k) for all j, k and so Hj(m0j +
1)−Hk(m0k) ≥ 0 for j ∈ J1 and k ∈ J2. This shows that L−R ≥ 0 and
therefore ψ(m) ≥ ψ(m0 for any m ∈ M. Therefore m0 is a minimal
solution.
3. If the condition Hj(m
0
j + 1) > Hk(m
0
k) is also satisfied for all j and k
with j 6= k then L−R > 0, that is, the minimal solution is unique.
4. Let m ∈ S with m = (m1, . . . ,mn). Suppose that there are j, k with
Hj(mj + 1) < Hk(mk). Then the multiset {Hi(`) | 1 ≤ ` ≤ mi, 1 ≤ i ≤
n} does not contain M smallest elements as we can replace Hk(mk) by
the smaller Hj(mj +1). Thus for all j, k we have Hj(mj +1) ≥ Hk(mk)
and by (2) m is a minimal solution.
Sainte-Lague¨ [7, Satz 6.1.8] knew that the Sainte-Lague¨ method min-
imised the error function with ϕj(x) =
1
qj
(x − qj)2. Balinski and Ramirez
[1] show that the linear divisor methods minimize the error function with
ϕj(x) =
1
qj
(x− qj + d0 − 12)2.
Corollary 6.3. The linear divisor method given by d0 can be obtained from
the algorithm MinimalSolution for the decomposable error function ψ,
with j-th component ϕj(x) =
1
qj
(x− qj + d0 − 12)2.
Proof. Note first that ϕj(x) is a convex function. The corresponding decom-
posable error function ψ always has a minimal solution. Algorithm Mini-
malSolution leads to the linear divisor method described by d0, because
we have that Hj(`) = ϕj(`)− ϕj(`− 1) = 2qj (`− qj + d0 − 1) =
2(`+d0−1)
qj
− 2
is strictly increasing. Consider the function Kj(`) =
qj
d0+`−1 . This function
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yields the standard algorithm for all linear divisor methods. Then Kj(`) is
strictly decreasing and therefore has a minimal solution which can be found
by the analog of algorithm MinimalSolution by selecting the M largest
elements in a matrix whose entries are Kj(`). Note that Kj(`) =
2
Hj(`)+2
and
therefore we can also find a minimal solution by applying algorithm Mini-
malSolution directly to the matrix Hj(`).
Corollary 6.4. Let ϕ be a symmetric and strictly convex function with
ϕ(0) = 0 and ϕ(x) > 0 for all x > 0. Let
ψ(m) =
n∑
j=0
ϕ(|mj − qρj |) =
n∑
j=0
ϕ(|mj − bqρj c − rρj |).
Then the algorithm MinimalSolution with the decomposable error function
ψ yields the ρ-rounding method.
Proof. Recall that for the ρ-rounding method we let qρ = (qρ1 , . . . , q
ρ
n) by
defining qρj =
qj
M
(M + 2ρ− 1). Define rρj by qρj = bqρj c+ rρj . We shall see that
the function ψ(m) yields the ρ-rounding method. For j ∈ {1, . . . , n} define
as in Theorem 6.2 Hj(x) = ϕ(|x− qρj |)− ϕ(|x− qρj − 1|). As ϕ(x) is strictly
convex, it follows that Hj(x) is strictly increasing for all x ∈ R. In particular,
Hj(bqρj c) ≤ Hj(qρj ) = −ϕ(1) < 0.
Also,
−ϕ(1) = Hj(qρj ) < Hj(bqρj c+ 1) ≤ Hj(`)
for all ` ≥ bqρj c + 1. Hence the union of the sets Lj = {` | Hj(`) ≤ −ϕ(1)}
contain
∑n
j=1bqρj c elements. By Equation (2) these are at most M elements
for 0 < ρ < 1 and at most M − 1 elements for ρ = 0 and at most M + 1
elements for ρ = 1. Therefore algorithm MinimalSolution allocates to
party Pj a number m
0
j ≥ |Lj| seats. If ρ ≤ 1, each party obtains at least bqρj c
seats and the remaining seats are allocated according to the smallest elements
among Hj(bqρj c + 1) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Since Hj(bqρj c + 1) = ϕ(1 − rρj ) − ϕ(rρj )
and ϕ is strictly convex we have ϕ(1 − rρj ) − ϕ(rρj ) ≤ ϕ(1 − rρk) − ϕ(rρk) if
and only if rρj ≥ rρk. Thus the remaining seats are allocated according to the
greatest remainders. If ρ = 0 and all rρj = 0 the additional seat is allocated
at random which corresponds to choosing a random minimal solution. If
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ρ = 1 and all rρj = 0 we have assigned M + 1 seats. One seat is taken from
a random party which corresponds to choosing a random minimal solution.
This yields precisely the ρ-rounding method.
Note that this was proved by Po´lya (1919), [10], for ρ = 1/2.
Corollary 6.5.
ψ(m) =
n∑
j=0
|mj − qρj | =
n∑
j=0
|mj − bqρj c − rρj |.
The ρ-rounding method can be obtained from the algorithm MinimalSolu-
tion for the decomposable error function ψ.
Proof. Choose ϕj(x) = |x − qj|. Note that this function is convex, though
not strictly convex. Now
Hj(x) = |x− qρj | − |x− qρj − 1| =

−1 x < qρj
2x− 2qρj − 1 qρj ≤ x ≤ qρj + 1
1 x > qρj + 1
.
Observe that Hj(x) is strictly increasing for q
ρ
j ≤ x ≤ qρj + 1. Thus the proof
of Corollary 6.4 immediately generalises to this situation.
Corollary 6.6. Let ϕ(x) = (x−qρj )p for all p ≥ 1 and let ψ(m) =
∑n
j=1 |qρj−
mj|p. Then the algorithm MinimalSolution with the decomposable error
function ψ yields the ρ-rounding method.
Obviously one can also take the p-th root of ψ(m) as the function ψ and
this shows that all `p-norms can be used as error functions. In particular
for p = 2 the `2-norm is the usual Euclidean distance. Thus the ρ-rounding
method also minimises the Euclidean distance between the points qρ and
m0, and thus yields the closest integer valued lattice point for each vector q
of exact quotas. Note that this was known to Po´lya (1918), [9], for general
convex functions ϕ and to Birkhoff (1976), [3], for the `p-norms. Finally we
emphasize that
lim
p→∞
ψp(m) = ψ∞(m) = Maxj=1,...,n(|mj − qρj |) = ||m− qρ||∞
yields that the ρ-rounding method also minimises the maximum norm.
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7 The paradox paradoxa
We finish this paper by discussing certain paradoxa. As all linear divisor
methods except Sainte-Lague¨’s and all ρ-rounding methods except Hare’s
are biased, we restrict our attention to these two methods. First we show, by
giving some examples, that the Sainte-Lague¨ method comes with its own set
of paradoxa. It is very susceptible to minor variations in quotas (Instability
Paradox). We demonstrate that it violates the Majority Condition in a
major way and finally show that the seat distributions for one party can
vary immensely when the votes of other parties change.
We then consider the Hare method. Here we address the highly publicised
New State, Alabama and Increased Votes paradoxa and argue why
we believe that this is no paradoxical behaviour. Finally, we show how a
slight modification of the Hare method fulfils the majority condition.
7.1 The method of Sainte-Lague¨
7.1.1 Instability Paradox
The method of Sainte-Lague¨ displays the Instability Paradox, that is
small variations in the exact quotas can lead to large variations in the seat
allocations. In the following two examples we see in the case where one party
has the absolute majority of the votes, variations in the votes of the small
parties can lead to significantly different seat allocations for the major party,
without any changes in the votes of the major party. Similar examples are
also discussed by Huntington (1928), [6, p. 95].
For example, suppose 5 parties, 4 of which are very small, are competing
in an election for M = 68 seats. If the exact quotas given by the election
are:
q1 = 65.91, q2 = 0.53, q3 = 0.521, q4 = 0.52, q5 = 0.519,
then the seat allocation according to Sainte-Lague¨ is:
m1 = 64, m2 = m3 = m4 = m5 = 1
whereas for a slightly different election result for the 5 parties, namely
q1 = 66.075, q2 = 0.485, q3 = 0.481, q4 = 0.48 and q5 = 0.479
the seat allocation according to Sainte-Lague¨ is now:
m1 = 68, m2 = m3 = m4 = m5 = 0.
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A change of the exact proportions by 0.165 seats enforces upon the large party
a change of 4 seats. With Hare’s method in both cases the seat allocation
would be m1 = 66, m2 = m3 = 1, m4 = m5 = 0.
Of course these are extreme examples, but even under such conditions an
election method has to be able to prove itself.
7.1.2 The Majority Paradox
The Sainte-Lague¨ method also displays the Majority Paradox. It can
happen that a party obtains more than 50 % of the votes but receives several
seats less than 50 % of the seats.
For example, at a community election of a town council with M = 51
seats the following exact quotas might occur:
q1 = 26; q2 = 7.96; q3 = 5.84; q4 = 4.78;
q5 = 3.72; q6 = 1.60; q7 = 0.56; q8 = 0.54.
Then the seat allocation according to Sainte-Lague¨ is:
m1 = 24; m2 = 8; m3 = 6; m4 = 5; m5 = 4; m6 = 2; m7 = m8 = 1.
Even though Party 1 won the absolute majority of the votes and was even
allocated 26 seats by the exact quota, it looses 2 seats through the allocation
method and therefore looses the absolute majority in the council.
7.1.3 Vote Stability Paradox
This example also displays the Vote Stability Paradox. A slightly dif-
ferent election result could have been:
q1 = 26; q2 = 8.03; q3 = 7.09; q4 = 6.12;
q5 = 1.415; q6 = 1.405; q7 = 0.472; q8 = 0.468.
Then the seat allocation according to Sainte-Lague¨ is:
m1 = 28; m2 = 8; m3 = 7; m4 = 6; m5 = m6 = 1; m7 = m8 = 0.
Note also a variation of 4 seats for the largest party between these two elec-
tions, even though in both cases the number of votes for the largest party
was the same. The smaller parties dictated the outcome. Apart from these
examples, especially if a 5% hurdle is installed, the results of Sainte-Lague¨
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and Hare’s procedure are almost always the same. For many Federal elec-
tions Sainte-Lague¨ and Hare differed in the seat allocation for the Lower
House (Bundestag) only in two cases. The effect of the 5% hurdle is much
larger than the change of apportionment method. However, if the 5% hurdle
is abolished, the effect of the apportionment methods becomes much larger
and is sometimes surprising, as the examples above point out.
Note that this cannot happen in any ρ-rounding method as the seat vari-
ations for a given party for constant M, A and number of votes is at most
one seat.
7.2 The Hare method
7.2.1 New State Paradox
Many people think there is a paradox in the method of the greatest remain-
der. Especially, the New State Paradox (or “Parteizuwachsparadox”): if
a new party enters the apportionment method without changing any of the
original votes of the other parties, then it can happen that the new party
gets a certain number of seats but in addition, there is a redistribution of the
other parties too. For instance, Pukelsheim (1989), [11, Table 6], gives the
following example. Consider parties A,B,C and D which each have attained
320, 238, 79, and 17 votes, respectively. If we distribute 37 seats among par-
ties A,B, and C, then according to the method of Hare, they receive 18, 14
and 5 seats, respectively. However, if we distribute 37+1 seats among parties
A,B,C, and D then they receive 19, 14, 4 and 1 seats, respectively. This
seems to be a paradox as nothing has changed in the votes for the parties A,
B, and C. Nevertheless, the party A took one seat away from party C.
To understand this behaviour, we have to calculate the exact quotas
qA, qB, qC for parties A, B and C, which are
qA = 320 · 37/637 = 18.587127,
qB = 238 · 37/637 = 13.824175,
qC = 79 · 37/637 = 4.588697.
If we add the votes for party D then we obtain at total of 654 votes and
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the exact quotas q′A, q
′
B, q
′
C , q
′
D for parties A, B, C and D are
q′A = 320 · 38/654 = 18.593272,
q′B = 238 · 38/654 = 13.828746,
q′C = 79 · 38/654 = 4.590214,
q′D = 17 · 38/654 = .987767.
In our opinion this behaviour does not deserve the label paradox as it
is easily explained. The new party D changes the exact quotas of all other
parties and hence to obtain a fair apportionment of the seats as close to the
exact quotas as possible, it is only fair that the seat allocation changes. The
literature which label this behaviour a paradox avoids the exact quotas like
the bubonic plague.
7.2.2 Alabama Paradox
The Alabama Paradox (Mandatszuwachsparadox) appeared first in the United
States. If one increases the number of seats from M to M ′ then it may hap-
pen that a party receives more seats when M seats are distributed than when
M ′ are distributed. When computing all seat allocations for the American
House of Representatives using the ρ-rounding method for ρ = 1/2 and the
election results from 1880 and varying the possible seat numbers between
275 and 350, the chief Clark of the Census office noticed that for M = 299
and M ′ = 300 the number of representatives for Alabama decreased from 8
to 7, see Balinski and Young (1982), [2, Table 5.1]. This cannot happen in
linear divisor methods.
Since the Hare method respects quotas it may happen that the exact
quotas change by increasing the number of seats. As a result the number
of seats a party receives might fall back to its lower quota. Perhaps a good
way to explain the situation is to think of the lower quotas as the guaranteed
number of seats for each party and an additional seat as a bonus. The bonuses
are then distributed according to greatest claim. They are not guaranteed.
It can thus happen that with different number of seats the bonus seats are
reallocated.
Consider for example three parties who received the following votes: a1 =
107890192; a2 = 197827864; and a3 = 18986361. Thus the total number of
votes is A = 324704417. The following table lists the exact quotas and the
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seat allocations using Hare’s and Sainte-Lague¨’s method for M = 94 seats
and M = 95 seats.
Exact Quotas q1 = 31.2336 q2 = 57.2700 q3 = 5.4964
M = 94 Hare m1 = 31 m2 = 57 m3 = 6
Sainte-Lague¨ m1 = 31 m2 = 57 m3 = 6
M = 95 Hare m1 = 32 m2 = 58 m3 = 5
Sainte-Lague¨ m1 = 31 m2 = 58 m3 = 6
While at a superficial glance it seems unfair that the third party should
have a seat less when more seats in total are allocated, a look at the exact
quotas explains the situation. By the addition of one seat all exact quotas
increase by the same percentage. The ρ-rounding method is closer to the
ideal of being as close to exact proportion as possible.
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